

Table 1: SUMMARY OF AD HOC COMMITTEE MEETING NO. 1 COMMENTS

Comment No.	Comment	Significance	IRB Comments
1	<p>The use of the term “Comprehensive Needs Assessment” implies a more thorough examination of needs than currently proposed via the identified six (6) tasks and may be interpreted by the public as misleading.</p>	<p>Medium/ High</p>	<p>The IRB agrees that the title of the study (taken alone) could lead many stakeholders to expect a more expansive scope than currently envisioned. Expectations surrounding a “Comprehensive Needs Assessment” will vary widely according to the perspective of the reader of the final report. A significant risk in not addressing the comment would be the ability for detractors to discount or dismiss the study as not being comprehensive. This comment is closely related to IRB recommendation M1-22. It would seem that recommendation 1c from the Ad Hoc committee would be a reasonable approach to addressing this concern. The introduction of the final report could define the scope of the CNA effort, and it could identify other items not addressed in the scope of the CNA along with how those issues are being addressed by DWR.</p> <p>To implement recommendation 1a of the Ad Hoc Committee, consider renaming the study “Facility Needs Assessment”. This would eliminate potential criticism surrounding the term “comprehensive” and would help focus expectations that the study is mainly about assessing the physical features of the facility and not the human or organizational factors within DWR or the operation of the facility.</p> <p>DWR may also consider providing the Ad Hoc Committee a briefing on some of the other efforts that DWR has completed and continues to undertake to address other issues of concern to the Ad Hoc Committee such as site security, terrorism, etc.</p>
2	<p>Proposed criteria by which to evaluate “safety” and “reliability” have not been provided, thus precluding the Ad Hoc Committee from</p>	<p>Medium</p>	<p>While the basis for this comment demonstrates some understanding of risk and safety, the comment itself indicates an unrealistic view of safety. The notion that there is a discrete threshold between safe and unsafe conditions is not an appropriate model for assessment of safety issues. Safety will always exist as a continuum. Even the occupational health and</p>

	<p>communicating to the public the proposed thresholds between safe/not safe and reliable/not reliable.</p>		<p>safety industry (which specializes in this topic) has no widely accepted metrics to define the threshold between safe and unsafe conditions. Regulators such as OSHA and FERC can establish minimum requirements for safety, but these do not imply absolute safety and they are subject to change when significant accidents/incidents occur. Responsible parties (such as dam owners) must understand the risk environment in which they operate and make reasonable decisions about the tradeoffs between safety practices/investments and other factors. We agree with the aspect of the comment that calls for documenting the factors/metrics to be considered in decision making. At the same time, we believe it would be misleading to the public to propose specific thresholds of safety other than those specified by regulation. We see this as an area that requires discussion with the Ad Hoc committee on basic concepts of safety including “Hierarchy of Controls”. A basic tenet of risk management is that greater potential consequences require greater levels of safety controls/investments to meet societal risk aversion expectations.</p>
<p>3</p>	<p>Timely public dissemination of select relevant documentation will aid the Ad Hoc Committee to fulfil its role of communicating accurate information and context about the current needs assessment for Oroville Dam and appurtenant structures initiative.</p>	<p>Medium</p>	<p>DWR and other infrastructure owners have significant challenges in determining the appropriate balance between sharing and withholding information. Without question sharing of information is tremendously beneficial when shared with those who intend to use it to protect or benefit others. However, sharing it publicly also makes that information available to those who wish to do harm to America’s infrastructure, economy, people, and/or facilities.</p> <p>The basis provided for comment 1 indicates a desire to include security in the CNA. A key element of any security program is an information security component in which information is scrutinized prior to dissemination. Key information in the wrong hands can provide important targeting information and vulnerabilities that can potentially be exploited to do harm.</p> <p>While we agree with the usefulness of the information to the Ad Hoc committee, DWR must also consider a higher-level purpose of protecting</p>

			that information which could be used to bring harm to the people of the Feather River Valley, California and the nation.
Other Questions 1	<i>Directed to the IRB:</i> Please explain the reasoning behind examining active management of the lake levels at 350' to 640' in the context of the CNA. What is the driving force behind this question?		The recommendation was made looking beyond the CNA study toward decisions about investments to be made to improve the safety and reliability of Oroville Dam. In water resources, it is frequently difficult to justify significant capital investment solely on the desire to improve safety. Recognizing that a safety improvement of a low level outlet that would allow the release of water below elevation 640 could have other significant benefits to project purposes may improve the chances for securing the funding to implement such an alternative.