

Meeting Summary
Oroville Dam Citizens Advisory Commission
Meeting #17: August 2, 2024
10:00 a.m.–Noon
Virtual Meeting

This summary provides an overview of the August 2, 2024, Oroville Dam Citizens Advisory Commission (OCAC) meeting and focuses primarily on capturing the comments and questions posed by commissioners and members of the public. It is organized by agenda topic to assist readers in cross-referencing the meeting materials. This document is not intended to serve as minutes of the meeting or a transcript of the discussion. Related materials, including the slide deck and a video recording, are available on the [OCAC Website](#).

Meeting Agenda

- Welcome and opening remarks
- Annual Dam Safety Project Update
- Independent Assessment of SWP Dam Safety Program
- Role of Division of Safety of Dams Briefing
- Inundation Map Update
- Public Comment and Questions

Action Items

Action Items from Meeting 16

- Proposed new action items
 - Discrete action items:
 - David Sarkisian to share with commissioners any sedimentation studies of the upper watershed.
 - Add as future agenda topics:
 - Explore the status of the Oroville levee and next steps, including City of Oroville-Sutter Butte Flood Control Agency coordination.
 - Provide regular updates on DWR's activities based on the recommendations of the Owner Dam Safety Audit.
- Proposed items to mark as "resolved"
 - #40 — Institutionalize regular communication between DWR State Water Project leadership and Oroville Mayor and City Manager (e.g. daily texts on operational activities) to ensure that it continues past the current occupants of those positions.
 - #41 — Schedule a small group meeting before Meeting 17 with DWR, Commissioner Robert Bateman, and Matt Mentink to dive more deeply into how risk is being assessed, including reviewing Meeting 16 presentations 1 and 2, discussing the ways in which likelihood was determined in the Risk Matrix, discussion of studies and how they are funded, and the budget for the state Division of Safety of Dams and where DSOD interacts in the decision making.
 - #42 — Agendize a follow-up presentation for Meeting 17 to update the Meeting 16 discussion on project prioritization and budget. (Please note that ongoing updates on this topic will be part of the ongoing items on the Tracker.)

Rollcall

As mandated by the requirements set forth in Senate Bill 955 (2018, Nielsen), the Commission comprises representatives from the following agencies and public bodies. Attendance at Meeting 17 on August 2, 2024, is noted in the table below.

Agency or Public Body	Commissioner (or Alternate)	Attendance
California Natural Resources Agency	(Chair) Secretary Wade Crowfoot	No
California State Senate	Senator Brian Dahle (represented by Bruce Ross)	Yes
California State Assembly	(Vice Chair) Assemblymember James Gallagher (represented by Juleah Cordi)	Yes
Department of Parks and Recreation (DPR)	Director Armando Quintero (represented by Superintendent Matt Teague)	Yes
Department of Water Resources (DWR)	Director Karla Nemeth	Yes
California Governor's Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES)	Chief Deputy Director Tina Curry (represented by Deputy Director Lori Nezhura)	Yes
Oroville City Council	Mayor David Pittman	Yes
Oroville City Council	Vice Mayor Eric Smith	Yes
Butte County Board of Supervisors	Supervisor Tod Kimmelshue	Yes
Butte County Board of Supervisors	Supervisor Bill Connelly	Yes
Representative on behalf of Butte County Board of Supervisors	Robert Bateman	Yes
Yuba County Board of Supervisors	Supervisor Seth Fuhrer	No
Yuba Office of Emergency Services	OES Manager Oscar Marin	Yes
Sutter County Board of Supervisors	Supervisor Mat Conant	No
Sutter County Board of Supervisors	Supervisor Nick Micheli	No
California Highway Patrol	Lieutenant Commander Marc Stokes (represented by Mark McNabb)	Yes
Butte County Sheriff's Office	Sergeant Brian Evans	No
Yuba County Sheriff's Office	Operations Captain Nathan Lybarger	No
Sutter County Sheriff's Office	Deputy Andre Licon	No

Welcome and Opening Remarks

Karla Nemeth, California Department of Water Resources (DWR) Director, welcomed Commissioners, presenters, and the public to the seventeenth meeting of the Oroville Dam Citizens Advisory Commission (OCAC). Director Nemeth chaired the meeting on behalf of

Commission Chair California Natural Resources Agency (CNRA) Secretary Wade Crowfoot and Commission Vice Chair California State Assemblymember James Gallagher.

Director Nemeth acknowledged the Thompson Fire that started over the Fourth of July weekend. Although the fire forced many Oroville residents to evacuate and destroyed some structures, no lives were lost. The fire caused DWR to temporarily shut down the Hyatt Power Plant and the Oroville Thermolito Complex operations. Director Nemeth expressed the State's continued support for the firefighting efforts and communities at risk and thanked Oroville Mayor David Pittman for his leadership during the Thompson fire.

Mayor Pittman thanked Director Nemeth for the State's continued support, as well as the support of other agencies that provided mutual aid. He emphasized the importance and benefits of defensible space.

Director Nemeth reviewed the agenda for OCAC Meeting 17 and noted that the Action Item Tracker enables commissioners to track topics from prior meetings. She then introduced the new Deputy Director of the State Water Project, John Yarbrough. In his new position, he oversees a workforce of over 2,000 employees who are responsible for the design, construction, maintenance, and operation of the State Water Project.

Deputy Director Yarbrough reflected on DWR's prioritization of public safety and ensuring facilities are operated to the highest standards. He said that David Gordon will serve as the primary liaison with DWR and the Commission and that the two of them will work together to ensure a successful transition.

He shared that the United States Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) plans to schedule a public meeting later this year to provide an opportunity for DWR and members of the public to engage with the Oroville Dam Water Control Manual Update process.

Emphasizing how the Corps is responsible for the Water Control Manual's public input process, Director Nemeth stated that the Commission itself will not take an official position on the update because its members represent diverse viewpoints. However, the Commission will serve as a public forum for updates on the Corps' engagement with respect to the Water Control Manual update, including a presentation at the next Commission meeting.

Director Nemeth provided an update on action items from Meeting 16: DWR organized two small group meetings with a few commissioners and downstream community members to follow up on specific requests for more information related to project prioritization and flood topics. Summaries of the small group meetings, along with Commissioner Robert Bateman's conclusions memo, were sent to commissioners and posted publicly on the Commission website.

Commissioner Bateman provided a recap of his conclusions from the small group meetings, emphasizing the importance of the spillway to safety. He expressed concerns about the accuracy of flood forecasting models and which agency is responsible for Oroville's "orphan levee." Commissioner Bateman requested increased community involvement in the Water Control Manual update process. He also suggested that the OCAC's influence should expand to include oversight of that process.

Supervisor Bill Connelly agreed with Commissioner Bateman's comments. He said he's concerned about the logic behind why OCAC would not be part of the Water Control Manual

Update process. He also noted the importance of DWR's involvement as the dam operator. Supervisor Connelly stated that the responsible agency for the "orphan levee" must be resolved; the safety of the residents of downtown Oroville and the communities below will be at risk if the levee "blows out." He acknowledged the improvement in communication and relationship between DWR and local communities. He urged Director Nemeth and the DWR staff to seriously consider the Commission's and the public's concerns on this matter.

Director Nemeth thanked Commissioners for their comments and urged Commissioners to provide input in the Corps' Water Control Manual Update process, noting that DWR has and will continue to provide input. The Corps will provide an update at the next Commission meeting. Director Nemeth acknowledged the OCAC's inherent makeup as a representation of diverse interests and stressed the complexities of such an entity providing oversight in a federal agency's process. She said it is important for DWR and the Commission to bring their concerns in a scientific and organized way to the table.

Mayor Pittman provided further context on the "orphan" levee. Placed in 1913, it was originally a four-inch slab of concrete with more that has been placed on top of it since then to protect parts of downtown Oroville. As the city expanded through the 20th century, safety precautions like a master drainage plan were never put in place for areas protected by this levee. City officials are talking with Sutter Butte Flood Control Agency (SBFCA) about the need for a master drainage plan. The old age and lack of understanding around the "orphan" levee adds to concerns about its future operation and maintenance.

Commissioner Bateman asked how Commissioners can organize themselves to contribute to the Corps' Water Control Manual Update process without necessarily serving as an "oversight" entity and who will be responsible for helping Mayor Pittman with the "orphan" levee issue.

Director Nemeth said there will be a subsequent discussion on the Water Control Manual at another meeting.

Mayor Pittman noted the City's limited resources and his hopes that the SBFCA can help with the "orphan" levee issue. There are multiple solutions, including reinforcing the existing levees or widening the wildlife area.

Before the presentations, Director Nemeth highlighted the following key points:

1. Commissioners need to limit serial communications among fellow Commissioners outside of the OCAC forum (including phone calls, emails, side conversations, etc.) that could together constitute a quorum to ensure the Commission is in compliance with the Bagley-Keene Act per California law.
2. This meeting will also include the distribution of an action item tracker, and members are invited to review and provide input before the next OCAC meeting.

Annual Dam Safety Project Update

David Sarkisian, Manager of the O&M's Dam Safety Services and the SWP Dam Safety Program at DWR provided updates on:

- The Oroville Dam flood control outlet and toe piezometer data
- Flood control outlet gated monoliths
- Emergency Spillway Erodibility Study
- Revised Oroville Storage Capacity Curve
- Five-Year Director's Safety Review Boards and FERC Part 12D Safety Inspections

He began by acknowledging frequent usage of the spillway in Water Year 2024 due to the near-daily outages at the Hyatt Power Plant as part of the River Valve Outlet System Rehabilitation project. In February, peak inflows were about 36,000 cubic feet per second (cfs), and peak releases were about 18,000 cfs.

The piezometers installed in the flood control outlet foundation have not exhibited high groundwater pressure with the spillway releases or the high reservoir conditions. Piezometer B-162, located in Pier 1 at the edge of the Monolith, continues to show a response to precipitation, as designed. Overall, data continues to demonstrate high-quality foundation and concrete-bedrock contact and lack of uplift pressures. Mr. Sarkisian shared graphs showing the correlation of groundwater levels within the piezometers to precipitation, a trend seen in 2023 and 2022. The data confirms DWR's understanding that pore pressures under the flood control outlet are primarily driven by precipitation.

Mr. Sarkisian discussed updates to the modeling analyses for Monoliths 25 and 26, made in response to specific feedback received from the Division of Safety of Dams (DSOD) and to incorporate pore pressures recorded from piezometers. The modeling results show better performance under seismic loading and potentially less need for retrofits. Additionally, the Flood Control Outlet (FCO) Bridge meets the performance standards for "no collapse" for a 10,000-year seismic event.

Mr. Sarkisian reviewed the FCO projects and studies timeline: FCO non-linear analysis of existing conditions and modeling were completed between 2018–2021; modeling updates and were started in 2022 and will be complete in 2027 along with a quantitative risk analysis. In 2027, DWR will initiate any necessary retrofitting design and permitting (including, although unlikely, the possible consideration of a new FCO headworks structure).

Regarding the Emergency Spillway Erodibility Study, Mr. Sarkisian listed the tasks that already have been completed:

- Updates to the geologic model;
- Hydraulic modeling of splitting of flows between FCO and emergency spillway; and
- Emergency spillway capacity analysis.

Tasks not yet complete include:

- Back-analysis of 2017 Incident to establish erodibility parameters
- 3D hydraulic modeling
- Erosion/scour model development
- Completion of the erodibility study; and
- Quantitative risk analysis. (For the Emergency Spillway Erodibility Study, five scenarios are anticipated to be modeled utilizing outflow hydrographs rather than "constant flow.")

DWR conducted the first Oroville reservoir capacity survey in 1965 and the first sediment survey in 1971. Several sediment surveys were done in the 1990s and 2000s. Mr. Sarkisian explained that the reservoir storage capacity has not been accurately measured since the dam's construction in 1965. Due to sedimentation and potential impacts from wildfires, an updated assessment is crucial for managing water resources and ensuring dam safety. The new data will inform the Water Control Manual Update and provide a baseline for future studies.

To address this, in 2022 DWR performed high-resolution multi-beam bathymetric and aerial Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR) surveys and then processed the data in 2023 to develop a

revised storage capacity curve, which indicates a reduction of lake storage by approximately 112,000-acre feet from the 3.5-million-acre feet number determined in the 1960s. DWR developed a communication and engagement plan to assist with the engagement of partnering agencies, interested parties, and the public to stage the rollout of the new information about lake capacity and inform the Water Control Manual Update.

Mr. Sarkisian updated commissioners on the 5-Year Director's Safety Review Board and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Part 12D Safety Inspections for Oroville Complex Dams, which occurred in 2023 and 2024. The Review determined that Oroville, Parish Camp Saddle, and Bidwell Bar Canyon Saddle Dams were safe for continued use and reservoir impoundment. The reviewing entities' recommendations included developing/adopting universal standards and best practices for structural deformation monitoring (surveying) to ensure consistency between different surveyors over the service life of the structures; and conducting a wave run-up analysis for Oroville and Bidwell Bar Canyon Saddle Dam, which includes hydrodynamic modeling of wave generation and propagation due to landsliding.

Bruce Ross from Senator Dahle's office (representative) asked about reservoir impacts from major wildfires in the watershed above Oroville Dam. Mr. Sarkisian explained how the SWP Dam Safety Program conducted a modeling analysis of woody debris and Oroville Field Division deploys crews on the lake to collect the debris. He said he would follow up with colleagues to get an answer to the question and would share any recent sedimentation studies performed due to the fires.

Independent Assessment of Safety of Dams Briefing

Joel Wortley, Advisory Services Principal and a geotechnical engineer from HDR, briefed the Commission on an independent, FERC-mandated audit of the State Water Project (SWP)'s Owners Dam Safety Program (ODSP) that HDR and GEI Consultants conducted.

The Audit included review of more than 500 documents, field division visits, and interviews between March and September 2023. Mr. Wortley noted that the SWP's Dam Safety Policy, which meets FERC standards and even exceeds the standards in places, was identified as a strength of ODSP. He noted that the SWP exhibits strong organization and communication of the program, particularly from the Chief Dam Safety Engineer, who is a strong champion and leader for the program.

Although SWP's ODSP compares favorably to industry practice and other dam safety programs, the program is in nonconformance to meet the standard of annual dam safety communication to staff. Opportunity areas identified for the SWP ODSP to operate more effectively and efficiently are:

1. Dam Safety, Policy, Objectives, and Expectations
2. Dam Safety Organization and Responsibilities
3. Dam Safety Training Program
4. Communications, Coordination, Reporting, and Reports
5. Records-keeping and Databases
6. Succession Planning
7. Continuous Improvements

The Audit identified that organizational change and aging infrastructure is one of SWP ODSP's ongoing challenges. The OSDP will have to keep up with management changes and leverage them for the betterment of the programs and ensuring dam safety is kept informed. Attraction and retention of qualified staff is the other main ongoing challenge faced by SWP's ODSP. This

includes engineers and technical staff, as well as field staff; institutionalized knowledge is important for succession planning processes for a successful program. Mr. Wortley emphasized that while technological advances are important, dam safety ultimately relies on people and judgement.

Commissioner Bateman asked if the auditors examined the accuracy of the flow measurements like those in the river gauges and across the gated spillway.

Mr. Wortley replied that this level of technical detail would have fallen outside of their scope, which focused mostly on the administrative aspects of the program such as internal processes and organization.

Vice Mayor Eric Smith expressed appreciation for Mr. Wortley's presentation and commented on the "orphan" Oroville levee. He asked whose scope of responsibility the levee falls under; he also asked that the Commission continue to include the "orphan" levee as a Commission meeting topic given how concerning it is for Oroville citizens.

Director Nemeth responded that often flood systems can be fragmented in terms of ownership and responsibility. She emphasized the importance of the OCAC as a forum to talk and coordinate between the community members and the State on topics like the status of the "orphan" levee.

Butte County Supervisor Tod Kimmelshue asked Director Nemeth about what happens now that the audit is done.

Mr. Sarkisian responded that the Dam Safety Services Program submitted a plan to FERC outlining the steps to complete the recommendations and will provide an update to the management committee. The program has five years until the next audit to attempt to accomplish the OSDP recommendations.

Mr. Yarbrough added that the area identified in noncompliance with FERC standards, the annual communications to staff, is currently being addressed. DWR has communicated this action to FERC.

Role of Division of Safety of Dams Briefing

Sharon Tapia, Division Manager of the California Department of Water Resources (DWR) Division of Safety of Dams (DSOD), provided an overview of the California Dam Safety Program and DSOD's oversight of the Oroville Dam. Its mission is to reduce life loss and property damage from an uncontrolled dam release resulting from a failure of the dam or its appurtenant structure, such as an outlet, spillway, or saddle dam.

DWR serves as both a dam regulator and owner. Organizationally separate deputy directors independently manage each function. DSOD independently regulates State-owned dams in the same manner as any other State-regulated dam. State-owned hydropower dams are dually regulated by DSOD and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).

The California Dam Safety Program was created in 1929 in response to the catastrophic failure of the St. Francis Dam on March 12, 1928. It is one of the largest dam safety programs in the nation, with 93 full-time employees. The Fiscal Year (FY) 2023-2024 budget was \$27.8 million, most of which fund staff positions. Budget funds are not used for projects or for construction or

removal of dams. Dam owners are given the option to repair the dams to current standards, alter dams to jurisdictional size, or remove dams from jurisdiction.

DSOD's statutory authority is contained within both the California Water Code and the California Code of Regulations. A jurisdictional-sized dam is primarily based on the height of the dam and its storage capacity. Typically, dams with a height of 25 or more feet and a storage capacity of 50-acre feet or greater are under the jurisdiction of DSOD. It currently regulates 1,234 dams and has a varying inventory of dams with 200 dams that are over 100 feet high. Oroville Dam stands 770 feet with a storage capacity of 3.4-million-acre feet. DSOD has authority to supervise the maintenance and operation of dams to safeguard life and property from dam failure or uncontrolled reservoir release. It is prepared to respond to dam safety incidents and emergencies.

Ms. Tapia explained that dams in California have a current average age of 70 years, indicating aging infrastructure. Many were built before the more modern era of dam design and earthquake engineering methods. Dam owners range from private citizens to the State of California. DSOD regulates 19 of the dams owned by the State. Every year, dam owners must fully operate their critical control features on their outlet and spillway systems.

Dams are classified based on their downstream hazard potential, which evaluates downstream impacts to life and property if a dam should fail with a full reservoir. The hazard classification is not related to the dam's condition or age. DSOD uses the same hazard classification system as FEMA. Prior to 2017, the available classification levels were Low, Significant, and High. Extremely High has since been added. Dams with an Extremely High classification could impact 1,000 or more people with the potential of extensive loss of life. Oroville Dam is included in this category.

Many dams in California are in or upstream of densely populated urban areas. In some areas of California, dams are clustered around fault lines. In the case of a major earthquake, DSOD would implement an emergency operation center and deploy multiple teams to dam sites.

DSOD conducts independent reviews of proposed new dams and any enlargement, alteration, repair, or removal of an existing dam. The State Water Project submits reports to DSOD and an application if modifications are proposed on the Oroville Dam. DSOD conducts re-evaluation studies of existing dams which may include components such as a seismic stability analysis or an updated hydrology analysis.

A team of expert engineers and an engineering geologist lead the California Dam Safety Program, overseeing construction and inspections. Inspections are conducted annually except for low-hazard dams, which are inspected every other year.

DSOD has expanded its program for bolstering dam safety by incorporating risk-informed decision making at the recommendation of a technical advisory panel, as well as implementing a civil administrative enforcement program that was authorized several years ago.

The Risk Program will focus on the 700+ dams that are classified as High Hazard and Extremely High Hazard. The program will move from a pilot stage to a formal program in 2025 and will be used to inform and prioritize DSOD's re-evaluation efforts on dams of the highest hazard levels with potential deficiencies or weaknesses that could lead to dam failures.

The Enforcement Program works to issue notices of violations to non-compliant dam owners. If owners fail to take action, they may receive administrative complaints against them. Violators will have the option of an administrative hearing process if they choose to protest the complaints.

Inundation Map Update

Chris Fritz, Sutter Butte Flood Control Agency (SBFCA), provided an overview of the results of the City of Oroville inundation mapping effort. He thanked CNRA and DWR for their letter of support as a part of the application submitted to the Corps for a fully funded feasibility study to enhance the Oroville levee discussed earlier in the meeting. SBFCA has not yet heard back on the application decision.

Mr. Fritz gave a brief background on the inundation mapping study. The Oroville Dam Citizens Advisory Commission requested a study and focused on the high-flow releases from Oroville Dam. The study primarily examined potential flood risk to the south Oroville industrial area, south and east of the river. DWR provided a grant to SBFCA that funded the study. R&F Engineering conducted the analysis and prepared the findings.

Mr. Fritz shared that in addition to the river channel modeling, SBFCA conducted interior drainage analyses. He presented visuals that depicted the delineation of the various subbasins within the watershed that make up the project area, as well as a LiDAR image that shows the area topography, to help attendees understand the flow of water from the foothills through the urban area and then into the river. The interior drainage system uses gravity and is composed of storm drains, culverts, and open ditches. As river levels rise during times of high releases, water will impound against the highway and back up into the interior drainage system. If this occurrence coincides with a precipitation event, there may be insufficient space for containing all the water and flooding may occur. Flooding also occurs from seepage of water through or under Highway 70.

An additional key finding is that when Feather River flows are greater than 60,000 cfs, the river starts to backflow through the Highway 70 box culverts into the gravity ditch system. There is inundation potential due to seepage under the Highway 70 embankment when river flows exceed 130,000 cfs. River backflows may impact properties near Highway 70. In 2017, Chinook salmon were observed in urban areas of Oroville because of the water backflow.

Mr. Fritz shared modeled maps that depicted the 1997 flooding event, as well as a hypothetical event where 200,000 cfs is being released from Oroville Dam and combines with a major rainfall event. Large areas of the maps showed inundation that exceeds five feet of water.

Mr. Fritz provided four key recommendations that resulted from the mapping study:

1. Develop a master drainage study and development of a master drainage plan. This is viewed as a logical next step for alleviating potential flood risk.
2. Conduct further hydrogeologic analysis to better understand the linkage for the seepage-induced flooding. This action could be rolled into recommendation #1.
3. Coordinate high-flow releases with forecasted rainfall events. Potentially incorporate related knowledge of rainfall events and water movement into the Water Control Manual Update. Forecasting technology is iteratively improved and can work to the advantage of dam operations.
4. Utilize and share this knowledge and information with emergency response providers to assist them with planning for potential emergency evacuation. This implies plans to

reroute evacuees away from Highway 70 in the case that it becomes unsafe due to flooding.

Supervisor Connelly stated that he and Mayor Pittman reviewed the maps and noticed inaccuracies and data gaps, such as Highway 70 being depicted as an actual levee. This process shows the importance of public input and participation so that evacuation protocols can be as safe and orderly as possible.

Mayor Pittman thanked everyone for their work on updating the inundation maps and stressed how they will help protect the community. He reiterated that for the water control process, it's not just the level of flow coming down the river, it's also the duration of the higher flows. He explained that some downtown businesses eventually moved up to the second floor of buildings on Montgomery Street because the first floors of buildings had gone through multiple rounds of post-flood repairs. Water pumps in the building basements can work to remove flood water. Mayor Pittman complimented DWR for providing ample communication regarding high-flow events that help the downstream community prepare.

Mr. Fritz shared that SBFCA is available to meet individually to answer technical questions, and if requested, will return to a future OCAC meeting to share new information.

Director Nemeth reminded everyone that CNRA will circulate the proposed Action Tracker updates and a proposed Meeting 18 agenda by August 9, 2024. Commissioner feedback and agenda topic recommendations must be sent by August 30, 2024.

Public Comment

Matt Mentink thanked the presenters for their remarks and suggested that Mr. Wortley share his presentation with additional groups. He feels that the Commission meetings have low attendance and noted that attendance might be an issue going forward as the OCAC charter mentions meeting attendance/absence, but he also acknowledged the schedule demands of the Commissioners. He expressed appreciation for Ms. Tapia's presentation, which provided information that has been publicly unavailable in the past. He suggested leading Mr. Sarkisian's presentation with the findings within the 2020 FERC recommendations of the existing conditions that have prompted many of these studies. The examples he cited are the recommendation to install a bulkhead gate; he wanted to know the location of the gate in relation to the piezometers, the strength of available data regarding the cracks in the structures and foundation, and the findings of the monolith 31 study. Mr. Mentink stated that bringing in this information would provide additional context for viewing the graph data. Lastly, Mr. Mentink suggested adding the recommendations from Mr. Wortley's presentation to the Action Tracker as DWR responds to the recommendations and conclusions.

Adjournment

Director Nemeth adjourned the meeting by thanking the public, the presenters, and commissioners for their engagement at OCAC Meeting 17 as well as emergency responders who are working to keep the community safe during wildfire season.

The next Commission meeting is scheduled for Friday, December 6, 2024, from 10 a.m. to 12 p.m., and will be virtual. The agenda will be available to preview online in advance of the meeting.